

UNITED NATIONS

R

S



Security Council

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPG/CDR <i>120</i>	Date: <i>11/19/93</i>	Distr. GENERAL
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only	S/26488	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	24 September 1993	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART			
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info				TS authority for:
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C	ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C	

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON RWANDA

INTRODUCTION

The present report is submitted to the Security Council in pursuance of resolution 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993. By paragraph 9 of that resolution, the Council urged the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement. Paragraph 11 of the same resolution requested me to report on the contribution the United Nations could make to assist the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the implementation of such an agreement and to begin contingency planning in the event that the Council decided that such a contribution was needed.

In my last report on Rwanda (S/26350), I informed the Security Council that the peace agreement between the Government of Rwanda and RPF had been signed at Arusha (United Republic of Tanzania) on 4 August 1993. I indicated that the Government of Rwanda and RPF had called for the establishment of a neutral international force to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement. I informed the Security Council that I had decided to send a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda, in order to examine the functions that such a force could perform and to assess the human and financial resources that would be needed to carry them out. I stated that, in addition to Rwanda, the mission would also visit Dar-es-Salaam and Addis Ababa for consultations with the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Secretary-General of OAU.

The reconnaissance mission, comprising officials of the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) visited Rwanda from 19 to 31 August 1993. Its senior officials visited Dar-es-Salaam on 1 and 2 September and Addis Ababa on 3 September.

I. THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

The Council's attention is drawn to the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement and to those of its six protocols that are relevant to the Council's consideration of the contribution the United Nations could make towards the implementation of the agreement (see S/26350, para. 20).

The Protocols of Agreement on Power-sharing provides that the institutions for the transitional period, up to the elections for a democratically elected Government, will comprise a broad-based transitional Government with the participation of all main political parties. The major parties identified in the Agreements are the Mouvement républicain pour la démocratie et le développement (MRND), RPF, the Mouvement démocrate républicain (MDR), the Parti social démocrate (PSD), the Parti libéral (PL) and the Parti démocrate chrétien (PDC). The Transitional Assembly will be composed of members appointed by the various political parties.

Article 7 of the Agreement provides that the transitional institutions will be set up in Kigali 37 days after the signing of the Agreement, i.e. on 10 September 1993. However, this was based on the assumption that a neutral international force would be deployed by that date and that, with the arrival of that force, foreign troops stationed in Rwanda would withdraw. At that point, in accordance with the Agreement, RPF would deploy a battalion in Kigali to ensure the protection of its political leaders and to enable them to participate fully in the transitional institutions.

The Protocol of Agreement on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions states that the duration of the transitional period will be 22 months, with the possibility of one extension, which would have to be approved by a majority of 60 per cent of the Transitional Assembly.

The Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, including the Gendarmerie, specifically requests the assistance of a neutral international force led by the United Nations in the disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and retaining of the military personnel of the parties to be integrated in the national army. It also calls on the establishment of such a force to ensure the overall security of the country, especially the capital city of Kigali, as well as the protection of the expatriate community, and security of the continued distribution of humanitarian assistance.

The Protocol defines the neutral international force as a United Nations-led force, integrating as necessary the current OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG II) and made up of countries representing a cross-section of the international community. The NMOG I force, made up of 50 personnel from OAU countries, monitored the cease-fire from July 1992 to July 1993. In early August 1993, the force was replaced by the NMOG II force, which is currently made up of 132 personnel from OAU member countries.

The Protocol on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons calls for the involvement of the United Nations in the repatriation of refugees and is elaborated upon below (see sect. III C).

II. ACTIVITIES OF THE RECONNAISSANCE MISSION

During its visit to Rwanda, the mission was led by Brigadier General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada), Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). Between 19 and 31 August 1993, the mission held consultations with the President of Rwanda, General Juvénal Habyarimana, and with the Chairman of RPF, Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe,

as well as with other senior members of the Government and RPF, including Mrs. Agathe Uwiliugiymana, current Prime Minister, Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu, Prime Minister-designate of the broad-based transitional Government, and Mr. Paul Kagamé, Vice-Chairman of RPF and Commanding Officer of its armed forces. The mission also met with members of the diplomatic community accredited to Rwanda, with representatives of United Nations agencies and programmes and with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) executing humanitarian projects in the country. The reconnaissance mission also met with the OAU representative in Rwanda and the Commanding Officer of NMOG II.

During their visit to Dar-es-Salaam and Addis Ababa, the senior officials of the reconnaissance mission were joined by Mr. Macaire Pédanou, my Special Representative at the Arusha peace talks. They held consultations with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and other high officials of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and, in Addis Ababa, with Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of OAU, and his senior staff.

One of the major points raised by all those with whom the mission met related to the deployment of a neutral international force by 10 September, the date set in the peace agreement for the installation of the transitional institutions in Kigali. The concern of all parties was that, should the neutral international force not be deployed in a timely manner, a political vacuum might occur if the transitional Government was not established in Kigali. The mission responded by clarifying the decision-making process at the United Nations and by stressing that the dispatch of a peace-keeping force to Rwanda would depend on a final determination by the Security Council. President Habyarimana felt that it would be dangerous and hazardous to set up the transitional Government before the arrival of the neutral international force and emphasized that such a force should be strong enough to be credible. For his part, Colonel Kanyarengwe, Chairman of RPF, stated that it was imperative that the security of RPF be ensured by the United Nations and expressed his concern that the vacuum caused by the absence of a United Nations peace-keeping mission might be filled by paramilitary groups in the country.

After the reconnaissance mission explained that it would not be realistic to expect the deployment of the proposed neutral international force by 10 September, a number of alternative measures were put forward by the parties and OAU. In addition, the role that an enlarged NMOG might play in the implementation of the agreements was discussed. In this connection, it should be noted that the OAU Secretary-General explained to the mission that he was planning to enlarge NMOG II to a total of approximately 240 all ranks, and that OAU did not have the resources to sustain a larger force. Mr. Salim pointed out that, even for the enlargement of NMOG II to the size of a company, OAU would have to rely, for logistic support, on the contributions of the donor countries which had assisted in the establishment of NMOG I. Most importantly, Mr. Salim informed the mission that the mandate of NMOG II would necessarily be confined to monitoring the cease-fire.

Mr. Salim recalled that the mandate of NMOG II would expire on 31 October 1993, adding that if the Security Council authorized United Nations involvement in the implementation of the peace agreement, the expeditious deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force would be essential. With regard to the possible integration of NMOG II into such a force, Mr. Salim

expressed the view that the United Nations would have to work out arrangements directly with troop-contributing countries.

It was also suggested that, since it was not feasible to meet the expectations of the two parties with regard to the deadline of 10 September for the installation of the transitional institutions, the United Nations should reassure the Rwandese people by giving a positive signal regarding its willingness to contribute to the restoration of peace and national reconciliation in Rwanda. In this connection, in a statement issued on 10 September 1993 (S/26425), the President of the Security Council pointed out that the Council was aware of the hopes the Rwandese parties entertained regarding the assistance that the international community would provide for the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. The President of the Council in his statement also urged the parties to continue to honour the Arusha agreement in accordance with their commitments.

Many of those with whom the reconnaissance mission held consultations, including representatives of the diplomatic community, felt that the Arusha accords constituted the best way for the Rwandese people to work together towards peace and stability. They also stressed the urgency of implementing those accords so that the people of Rwanda could proceed with the challenging tasks of reconstruction and economic development. The mission reported that most Governments represented in Rwanda also anxious to see a sound economic recovery programme instituted expressed their willingness to assist the Rwandese people in carrying out the task of economic recovery.

During its stay in Rwanda, the reconnaissance mission visited the areas controlled by RPF in the north, as well as government military positions and outposts. It carried out a detailed survey of the forces of the parties, including their respective structures and equipment, troop dispositions and topography, by land and by air. It received detailed briefings from the NMOG II Commander on the present status and role of NMOG II in Rwanda.

The mission discussed with the parties the tasks envisaged for the neutral international force in the Arusha agreement in order to determine the contribution that could be made by the United Nations. In particular, the mission undertook an assessment of the essential requirements that would enable the proposed force to execute its monitoring functions in Rwanda. This included an assessment of the following areas: cease-fire compliance in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), establishment of cantonment and assembly areas for weapons and personnel, mine-clearance, security of humanitarian aid efforts, return of the refugees and displaced persons, disarming and demobilization of armed personnel and restructuring of the Rwandese Defence Forces and the Gendarmerie.

In regard to relief assistance, the mission worked out arrangements that could enhance the various aspects of ongoing humanitarian activities described below (see sect. III C).

III. UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTION

A. Military aspects

The main provisions of the Arusha peace agreement relevant to the proposed United Nations peace-keeping mission (herein referred to as "the Mission") are contained in the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie. The principal functions of the Mission could be grouped in four categories: (a) to assist in ensuring the security of the city of Kigali, (b) to monitor the cease-fire agreement, including establishment of an expanded DMZ and demobilization procedures, (c) to continue to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to the elections, and (d) to assist with mine-clearance, including training and mine-awareness programmes.

Under article 64 of the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces, the Mission would also be charged with the task of undertaking investigations either on complaints from the parties or on its own, of alleged non-compliance with any of the provisions relating to the agreement. In addition, the Mission would be called upon to provide security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons.

To ensure the effective conduct of the Mission's responsibilities, the Protocol calls for close cooperation and continuing consultations between the Force Commander, or his representative, the new Rwandese Defence Forces High Command Council and the "Conseil de Commandement de la Gendarmerie Nationale". This will be ensured through the holding of regular joint working sessions at all relevant command levels.

1. Concept of operations

The Mission would be based on the concept of operations described below.

Owing to the presence of several battalions of government forces in Kigali and the introduction into the city of the RPF leadership with a fully equipped RPF battalion, the Mission would establish a weapons secure area in and around Kigali. This zone would be defined as an area of approximately 10 kilometres in radius from the centre of Kigali within which the military units would be required to store their weapons and ammunition, except in those cases previously agreed to by all parties. The security of the city would be accomplished in four ways. First, the Mission would deploy an infantry battalion throughout the Kigali area with the aim of providing security for the international airport, the RPF battalion compound and government buildings and to assist in the recovery of arms from civilians. The battalion would require a wheeled armoured personnel carrier (APC) company for emergency deployment both in Kigali and in the expanded DMZ. Secondly, the Mission would monitor and verify the securing of weapons and the movement of all forces from both parties in the Kigali sector through the use of infantry and military observers. Thirdly, in monitoring the activities involved in the establishment of the new Integrated Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie, the Mission would deploy liaison officers to the headquarters of these new forces. Fourthly, the Mission would take appropriate

measures, as necessary, to assist in providing security for members of the transitional Government.

The Mission would monitor the cease-fire agreement through verification and control of the expanded DMZ and by the concentration, disarming, demobilization and integration of troops of both the parties and the Gendarmerie. This would be achieved by the deployment of military observers and a second infantry battalion (in addition to the two existing infantry platoons of NMOG II) in the DMZ and at the assembly points, cantonment points and integrated training centres. In accordance with the peace agreement, the responsibility for the identification of assembly zones, and thus the demarcation of the new DMZ, would rest with the Mission. A key task for the Force Commander would therefore be to confirm the proposed assembly zones, assembly points, cantonment points, integrated training centres and the demarcation of a new DMZ, in accordance with the agreement. From a total of 48 assembly and cantonment points and integrated training centres proposed by the two parties, the reconnaissance mission recommended that the number be reduced, subject to review by the Force Commander, to approximately 26 assembly and cantonment points and integrated training centres.

The reconnaissance mission conducted a survey of all armed forces in the country. The Rwandese Government declared it had an effective strength of 23,100 personnel deployed essentially in the northern part of the country and in the Kigali area. The RPF forces declared a strength of approximately 20,000 personnel concentrated north of the current DMZ. It was reported that the government Gendarmerie is made up of 6,000 personnel deployed essentially in the front lines. RPF does not have a gendarmerie. According to the Protocol, the process of demobilization of all of the forces and the Gendarmerie, and the subsequent training and integration of up to 13,000 personnel for the new National Army and 6,000 personnel for the new National Gendarmerie, is to be completed over a 7 to 9 month period. This process would commence on a date agreed to by the Mission and the transitional Government. The possible need to assist the parties with transporting their personnel, constructing shelters to accommodate the assembled troops and resupplying and/or feeding them would require special attention.

The approximately 35,000 (31,000 soldiers and 4,000 Gendarmerie) demobilized personnel who would not form part of the new Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie would benefit from vocational retraining and employment, in accordance with the Agreement, under the auspices of the Rwandese Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration and with the assistance of the United Nations programmes and agencies and NGOs.

The reconnaissance mission recommended that the Mission should have the capacity to provide escort and protection for humanitarian activities, as required, until relieved by the new Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie. It was also recommended that the Mission conduct essential force-related mine clearance. An overall mine-clearance programme is described in section III C below.

The effective execution of the Mission's tasks, as well as the rate at which they can proceed, depends not only upon the timely availability of resources, but also on the capacity of the local infrastructure (roads, fuel

supply, power supply, communications, warehousing space and personnel accommodation), as well as the Mission's repair and maintenance capabilities. Taking into account the state of the existing infrastructure in Rwanda, it would be essential for an engineer company to be deployed expeditiously to assist in restoring basic infrastructure, including roads and bridges necessary for the work of the Mission.

2. Proposed Force structure

The military observers of UNOMUR, established under Security Council resolution 846 (1993), would come under the command of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda, while maintaining their monitoring tasks on the Uganda/Rwanda border. The Mission would incorporate elements of the NMOG II forces already in place in the current DMZ (see annex I) under its command at the earliest opportunity.

The Mission's operations would be divided into five sectors. There would be a Kigali sector and a DMZ sector. Two other sectors would be located with the government forces and RPF forces respectively. UNOMUR would constitute the fifth sector. The Mission would be supported by engineer, aviation, communications and medical units, as well as by the necessary logistic and administrative staff. The Mission's Force headquarters would be located in Kigali.

A Military Observer Group headquarters would be responsible for command and control of the Military Observer Sectors and for administering all military observers in theatre. It would consist of a total of 20 military observers and would be comprised of the traditional branches of military staff.

The Government forces, RPF forces and UNOMUR Sectors would be composed entirely of United Nations military observers. These three Sectors, through their military observer teams, would be responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the two parties. The military observer Sectors would be responsible for, inter alia, the following tasks: monitoring the observance by the two parties of modalities for the definite cessation of hostilities as provided for in the peace Agreement; monitoring the assembly zones and the preparation and maintenance of assembly and cantonment points; verifying the disengagement of forces, the movement of troops to assembly points and of heavy weapons to cantonment points; monitoring discipline of troops inside and outside assembly points; verifying inventories of weapons and ammunition of the two parties and monitoring operations for the separation of heavy weapons from light weapons; verifying the identification of military personnel in the assembly points; verifying the distribution of non-lethal supplies to troops in assembly points; monitoring the security of troops in the integrated training centres and monitoring the operations for the demobilization of servicemen and gendarmes.

The Kigali and the DMZ Sectors would each consist of an infantry battalion and military observers, who would perform tasks similar to those described in paragraph 34, as well as assist in arms recovery and verification through the use of checkpoints and patrols and in providing security at assembly and

cantonment points. The DMZ Sector would also take under its command the two NMOG II platoons currently serving in Rwanda.

The two infantry battalions (800 all ranks each) must be capable of supporting themselves for at least 60 days. They would each consist of a heavy logistics company and four rifle companies.

The Mission would also need an engineer company consisting of 203 personnel which would be responsible, inter alia, for supervising the rehabilitation and repair of basic infrastructure to meet the Mission's operational requirements and for undertaking essential demining tasks, including explosive ordnance disposal.

The Mission's support elements would consist of a helicopter unit of 40 personnel and 4 utility helicopters and a light twin-engine aircraft, a movement control section of 20 personnel, a logistics company of 200 personnel and a medical platoon of 50 personnel.

3. Deployment schedule

The military personnel of the Mission would be deployed progressively as shown in Annex II and would conduct the operation in four phases.

Phase 1 would commence on the day on which the Security Council adopts the enabling resolution and would end on D-Day, the day on which the transitional Government is installed in Kigali. Given the time required to establish and deploy the proposed Mission, it is estimated that the transitional Government may not be installed until the end of 1993. The objective of this phase would be to establish the essential conditions needed to permit the secure installation of the transitional Government. The necessary command and control, service support, infrastructure and equipment would be put in place. This would require the immediate deployment of the military planning staff of the Mission headquarters (including approximately 25 military, 3 civilian police and 18 civilians). This phase would also see elements of the expanded NMOG II and UNOMUR observers continuing their respective mandates in the DMZ and on the Uganda-Rwanda border, but under command of the Mission. By the end of phase 1, the strength of the Mission would number a total of 1,428 military personnel, of whom 1,217 would be staff officers and formed troops and 211 would be military observers (including 77 military observers from UNOMUR and 54 from NMOG II).

Phase 2 would commence on D-Day and last until D-Day+90 or when the process of disengagement, demobilization and integration of the Forces and Gendarmerie begins. This phase would see the continued build up of the Mission to its peak strength. The expanded NMOG II and UNOMUR would be fully integrated as entities into the Mission and would continue to discharge their mandates. The major activities during this phase would be to continue monitoring the DMZ and the Uganda-Rwanda border and assisting in providing security in Kigali, the demarcation of the assembly zones, monitoring the modification of the DMZ and ensuring that all preparations for the disengagement, demobilization and integration process are in place. While the agreement did not specify a date for the start of the demobilization process, it did estimate that one month would be required to set up the support elements needed to conduct this

operation. However, the reconnaissance mission's estimate is that two to three months would be required to ensure that the infrastructure needed for demobilization is in place. By the end of this phase, the strength of the Mission would include a total of 2,548 military personnel, of whom 2,217 would be staff officers and formed troops and 331 would be military observers.

Phase 3 would commence on D-Day+90, or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process begins, and would last until D-Day+360, or when the process is completed. During this phase, the Mission would establish, supervise and monitor the new DMZ with a second infantry battalion, and would continue to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border. It would establish approximately 26 assembly/cantonment points and integrated training centres, monitor the movement of large bodies of military personnel in and through the DMZ and assist in maintaining general security in the country. Security would also continue to be provided in Kigali. By the end of this phase, the strength of the Mission would be in the process of reduction to approximately 1,240 all ranks.

Phase 4 would commence on D-Day+360, or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process is completed. This phase would last about 10 months. It would see the further reduction of the Mission's strength to the minimum level needed to assist in ensuring the secure atmosphere required in the final stages of the transitional period leading up to the elections. During this phase, the monitoring of the DMZ and of the Uganda-Rwanda border would cease. The residual strength of the Mission would amount to approximately 930 military personnel, of whom 850 would be staff officers and formed troops and 80 would be military observers.

B. Civilian police

The Arusha peace agreement calls on the United Nations to assist in maintaining public security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the Gendarmerie and Communal Police.

The law and order situation during the transitional phase would be dependent on several internal security considerations: possible political and ethnic tensions; the potential for a dramatic rise in armed banditry after the demobilization of the forces of the parties; the easy availability of weapons; the possible disruption of the humanitarian aid effort; and the inability of local agencies to cope effectively with rising crime in the country, particularly in Kigali.

In accordance with the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie would be reduced from a strength of approximately 6,000 to a strength of 1,800 during the demobilization phase. All members of the Gendarmerie would be screened, along with RPF candidates, for positions in the new Gendarmerie or for complete demobilization into the community. The Gendarmerie would subsequently be reconstituted with a maximum force level of 6,000 all ranks.

In order to verify that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, a small United Nations civilian police unit, headed by a Police

Commissioner, would be deployed in Kigali and the nine prefecture capitals and in specific police installations. It is estimated that a total of 60 police officers would be required. The police unit would consist of a headquarters of 10 officers, including a special investigation team; a Kigali district consisting of 20 personnel; and a provincial district consisting of monitoring teams for each of the prefectures (except Kigali), requiring a total of 30 personnel.

C. Humanitarian assistance

In addition to the provisions of the Protocol on Refugees and Displaced Persons, both the Government and RPF have indicated that international assistance will be essential in bringing about the successful implementation of the peace agreement. Humanitarian agencies will continue to provide assistance based on the principle of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

By March 1993, a total of 900,000 people, or approximately 13 per cent of the nation's population, had been displaced. The Secretary-General launched a consolidated appeal in April 1993 to meet the emergency needs of these displaced people. The international community has made cash and in-kind contributions of up to US\$ 100 million since January 1993. With the signing of the peace agreement, it is estimated that some 600,000 individuals have already returned to their homes. With their return, the emergency situation that arose earlier in the year has eased. For the estimated 300,000 people who remain displaced and continue to rely on emergency assistance in the camps, such assistance will continue to be provided.

If a United Nations operation is deployed in Rwanda, humanitarian assistance would need to be coordinated with the Mission's activities. Currently, the United Nations Resident Coordinator ensures coordination among United Nations agencies, and with the donor community and NGOs. He will continue to do so during the transitional period.

As a result of the decision of the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in February 1993 on its programme for Rwanda, UNDP and the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs will hold a Round-table Meeting on humanitarian assistance, which will include aspects of demobilization and reconstruction, in early 1994. In addition to local fund-raising efforts, the meeting will provide an excellent opportunity to solicit support from a larger number of donors and to inform them of the latest situation in the country. I hope that the donor community will continue to respond favourably to the financial needs in the humanitarian sector.

Regarding assistance to demobilized soldiers, a comprehensive programme catering to their needs is being studied using previous United Nations peace-keeping experience in other regions. The United Nations is encouraging the donor community to examine the possibility of pooling resources for the preparation and implementation of such a programme.

Finally, regarding the Rwandese who have taken refuge in neighbouring countries, the starting point of the implementation of the activities envisaged for the repatriation and reintegration of the returnees is the establishment of

the transitional Government. UNHCR has been coordinating refugee activities and has been making advance preparations in the countries of asylum. The return of refugees will be regulated through tripartite agreements among country of origin, country of asylum and UNHCR. The establishment of national committees for repatriation and local integration is also foreseen, as is the establishment of a Commission for Repatriation under the transitional Government.

It has been recommended that an information campaign be launched both in the countries of asylum and in Rwanda to promote the provisions of the peace agreement. Information relating to refugees and the options offered to them (repatriation, naturalization or to remain as aliens), should also be part of this information campaign.

Mine-clearance has been earmarked as a priority to ease the constant threat to the lives of the displaced persons. It has also been pointed out that, with their removal, a more direct access by humanitarian agencies to areas needing assistance would be possible. This requirement is specifically addressed in article 40 of the Protocol on Refugees and Displaced Persons.

It has been estimated that a mine-clearance programme would be confined to a small area of the northern part of the country. The most serious mine problem however, would be the location and detection of mines in tea and banana plantations, as well as on open grassland and on tracks. At present, land mines already pose a serious threat to the local population. This threat will continue to increase as displaced persons return to their villages.

The reconnaissance mission recommended that the United Nations initiate a mine-clearance programme, including a survey of existing locations, a mine-awareness campaign for displaced persons and refugees and a training programme in mine deactivation for the government and RPF engineer forces. An engineer element should be included within the military component to provide a local mine-clearance capability on routes necessary to the Mission's operations. In addition, should the training programme for both parties be deemed unworkable or unsafe, a professional mine-clearance company would be subcontracted as has been the practice in other peace-keeping missions.

There will be a need to continue substantial humanitarian assistance activities in the future. The United Nations Resident Coordinator will continue to serve as the coordinator for these activities, working in close cooperation with all relevant organizations of the United Nations system. It is anticipated that a capacity would be established in the Mission for liaison and coordination with the humanitarian assistance programme, in particular with respect to adequate security as may be necessary for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies and the process of demobilization and reintegration of armed forces into society.

D. Administrative aspects

The Mission would require an administrative component based in Kigali, with two regional offices. One regional office would be located in the northern city of Byumba. The second would be in Kabale, which is the present headquarters of UNOMUR. The administrative component would provide necessary support in areas

of personnel, finance, procurement, communications, travel, compensation, translation and interpretation, electronic data processing, etc. In order to provide information to the general public on the activities of the mission, the Mission would seek access to an established radio station.

It is estimated that a total of 127 international staff (26 Professional and 101 Field and General Service staff) and 68 locally recruited staff would be required. These figures include the 17 international staff and 7 locally recruited staff currently working in Uganda with UNOMUR. The 26 Professional staff would include 4 political officers, 2 public information officers, 1 human rights officer and humanitarian assistance officers.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In my report of 24 August (S/26350), I stated that the signing of the Arusha peace agreement had provided the Government of Rwanda and RPF with a political and democratic framework for resolving their conflict. The agreement gives the international community an opportunity to contribute to the successful implementation of the peace process. In this connection, I should like to acknowledge, with deep gratitude, the continuing efforts of the Facilitator, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Mwinyi, and of the Secretary-General of OAU, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, to encourage the parties to abide by the commitments they freely entered into when they concluded the Arusha agreement.

The Rwandese people face extensive hardship and a critical economic situation. There is a strong grass-roots desire to see an end to the destruction and suffering brought about by a protracted conflict. Both sides seem determined to achieve a durable peace through disarmament, demobilization and national reconciliation. At the same time, there is serious concern over the possibility that any inordinate delay in establishing the transitional Government may endanger the peace process. These concerns have been expressed to my reconnaissance mission by the leadership of both sides, the resident diplomatic community in Rwanda, NGOs and, especially, the Secretary General of OAU. I therefore consider that the United Nations should respond positively to the appeal of the parties for assistance in the implementation of the peace agreement, especially since the mandate of the OAU NMOG II force will terminate by 31 October 1993.

The proposed United Nations Mission in Rwanda should be deployed without delay following Security Council authorization in order to allow for the prompt establishment of the transitional institutions. The immediate deployment of an advance party, including the Force Commander, would underscore the determination of the United Nations for the rapid build-up of the military presence needed in Kigali and of the logistic base for deployment of the force. The subsequent introduction of observers and formed units would enable the force to contribute to the implementation of the disengagement, demobilization and integration phase, while providing an adequate level of security and a credible United Nations presence. Finally, the reduction of the military and civilian police components should ensure that the operation is carried out in a cost-effective manner while contributing, at the same time, to the maintenance of the stability required for the period culminating with the elections.

The UNOMUR observers currently deployed on the Uganda side of the Uganda-Rwanda border remain a necessary stabilizing factor. It is therefore considered that UNOMOR must continue to monitor that border until the end of the demobilization process. However, UNOMOR's chain of command and future logistics would be integrated into the proposed Mission.

I am encouraged by the restraint and desire for a lasting peace and national reconciliation shown by the parties since the signature of the Arusha peace agreement. They have demonstrated their goodwill by holding a number of joint informal working groups and by the support they provided to the reconnaissance mission in all of its fact-finding activities. The two parties also sent a joint delegation to the United Nations, which I met on 15 September. The joint delegation stressed to me the urgency of the establishment of a United Nations force, since the successful implementation of the Arusha agreement was predicated on its deployment. The delegation emphasized that, unless immediate action was taken to deploy the force, the implementation of the peace agreement would be seriously compromised as a result of the vacuum that would be created. I explained to the joint delegation that the decision regarding the establishment of such a force rested with the Security Council and that, even with the approval of the Council, it could take up to three months for such a force to be fully deployed. Under the circumstances, I urged the parties, in the interim, to respect the commitments they had undertaken in Arusha to work together for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of the country and to strictly adhere to the cease-fire.

In the light of the above, I recommend that the Security Council authorize the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to be known as UNAMIR, with the mandate of contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional Government. This operation would be deployed according to the schedule described in section III of the present report.

I further recommend that the Security Council urge Member States to support the current United Nations aid effort in Rwanda. UNAMIR and the United Nations Resident Coordinator would closely coordinate their respective activities in this regard.

Should the Security Council authorize the establishment of UNAMIR, it would be my intention to appoint a Special Representative who would lead the Mission in the field and exercise authority over all its elements. The military component of the Mission would be headed by a Force Commander. The Mission would operate under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. I would report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of UNAMIR. All matters that might affect the nature of the continued effective functioning of the Mission would be referred to the Security Council for its decision.

In accordance with established practice, UNAMIR would need to have freedom of movement, communications and inspection and to enjoy the other rights that would be necessary for the performance of its tasks in Rwanda. UNAMIR and its personnel would also have to be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Should the Security Council decide to establish UNAMIR, it would be my

S/26488
English
Page 14

intention to initiate consultations with the transitional Government with a view to promptly concluding a status-of-forces agreement along the usual lines.

In conclusion, I wish to stress that two essential conditions must be met to enable the United Nations to carry out its recommended role in Rwanda successfully and effectively. First, the parties must cooperate fully with one another and the United Nations in carrying out their commitments under the Arusha agreement. Secondly, the United Nations must be provided in a timely manner with the necessary human and financial resources. At a time of unprecedented financial constraints facing the United Nations, it is imperative that Member States be prepared to assume the obligations resulting from the new mandates they entrust to the Organization.

Annex I
Current demilitarized zone

Annex II

Deployment schedule and strengths by month - military component

MONTH	PHASE 1 Preparatory			PHASE 2 Broad-based Transitional Government			PHASE 3 Demobilization/integration									
	10. 93	11. 93	12. 93	1. 94	2. 94	3. 94	4. 94	5. 94	6. 94	7. 94	8. 94	9. 94	10. 94	11. 94	12. 94	1. 95
	M-DAY			D- DAY												
FORCE HQ	43	54														40
KIGALI SECTOR HQ	15												0			
KIGALI INF BN		300	800													
KIGALI UNMOS	15	78				42							0			
DMZ SECTOR HQ	18					15								0		
DMZ INF BN					500	800								700	300	
DMZ PL	60													0		
DMZ UNMOS	36					18								0		
UNMO GROUP HQ	20															80
UNOMUR SECTOR	77															0
RPF SECTOR				66		87							51	15	0	
GOVT. SECTOR				51		87							51	15	0	
ENGR COY		100		203						88			0			
LOG COY		100		200										89	0	
MED PL		50														0
MOV CTL	20															
TOTAL	304 ^{a/}	928	1 428	1 748	2 248	2 548				2 433			2 216	1 840	1 240	9

^{a/} Of total, 191 are already in Rwanda and Uganda with NMOG II and UNOMUR.